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THE ENFORCEABILITY OF FOREIGN
ARBITRATION CLAUSES UNDER THE
CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA ACT AFTER
VIMAR SEGUROS Y REASEGUROS, SA. v. MIV
SKY REEFER
I. INTRODUCTION
The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA)' regulates the terms
of ocean carriage by governing the rights, responsibilities, liabilities and
immunities rising out of bills of lading. Specifically, §1303(8) of the
Act voids any clause in a bill of lading that attempts to limit the liabil-
ity of a carrier for acts of negligence In June, 1995 the Supreme
Court, in Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, SA. v. M/V Sky Reefer,3 decid-
ed that foreign arbitration clauses contained in maritime bills of lading
do not limit liability as prohibited by COGSA.4 This decision rejects
precedent and is inconsistent with the purpose of COGSA.
1. 46 U.S.C. § 1300-15 (1994) (commonly called the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act or
COGSA).
2. The statute provides:
(8) Limitation of liability for negligence
Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving
the carrier or the ship from liability for loss or damage to or in connection
with the goods, arising from negligence, fault, or failure in the duties and
obligations provided in this section, or lessening such liability otherwise than
as provided in this chapter, shall be null and void and of no effect. A benefit
of insurance in favor of the carrier, or similar clause, shall be deemed to be a
clause relieving the carrier from liability.
46 U.S.C. app. § 1303(8)(1994) (commonly known as COGSA).
3. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322 (1995).
4. Id. at 2330.
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II. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
A. Facts
Bacchus Associates (Bacchus), a New York fruit distributor, con-
tracted with Galaxie Negoce, S.A. (Galaxie), a Moroccan fruit supplier,
to purchase a shipload of fruit and chartered the M/V Sky Reefer to
transport it from Morocco to Massachusetts.' Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha,
Ltd, a Japanese company, chartered the ship from M.H. Maritima,
S.A.6 When Nichiro received the cargo, they issued a form bill of lad-
ing to Galaxie, as shipper. After the ship set sail, Galaxie presented the
bill of lading to Bacchus! The bill of lading contained a foreign forum
selection clause that provided for arbitration of disputes in Tokyo.8
Bacchus found that between Morocco and Massachusetts the oranges
sustained over $1 million in damage. Bacchus was compensated by
their insurer Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros (Vimar Seguros), who then
brought suit against M/V Sky Reefer under the bill of lading. M/V Sky
Reefer moved to stay the action and compel arbitration. Vimar Seguros
opposed the motion on the grounds that the foreign arbitration clause
violated COGSA.9
B. Majority Opinion
In Vimar, the majority affirmed the Court of Appeals decision
which held that the foreign arbitration clause in the bill of lading did
not violate COGSA by limiting the liability of the carrier.'" The Court
asserted three major reasons for not invalidating the foreign arbitration
clause.
First, Justice Kennedy stated that there is nothing in the language
of the statute itself that prevents the parties from agreeing on a par-
ticular forum in which to settle disputes." He pointed out that in other
sections of COGSA, the legislature was very specific in outlining the
5. See id. at 2325.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. The bill of lading stated:
Clause 3: Governing Law and Arbitration
(1) The contract evidenced by or contained in this Bill of Lading shall
be governed by the Japanese law.
(2) Any dispute arising from this Bill of Lading shall be referred to
arbitration in Tokyo by the Tokyo Maritime Arbitration Commission
(TOMAC) of the Japan Shipping Exchange, Inc., in accordance with the rules
of TOMAC and any amendment thereto, and the award given by the arbitra-
tors shall be final and binding on both parties.
Vimar, 115 S. Ct. at 2325.
9. See id.
10. Id. at 2330.
11. Id. at 2327.
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responsibilities and liabilities of a carrier and ship." A carrier cannot
alter these obligations in such a way that limits their liability under
COGSA. However, §1303(8) is only a general prohibition against limit-
ing liability and does not reject forum selection clauses."3
Next, the majority rejected the argument that an increase in cost
and inconvenience to litigate an action in a foreign jurisdiction limits
the ability of Vimar Seguros to recover. 4 The Court based their deci-
sion on Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute." In Carnival, the court
upheld a forum selection clause that required the purchasers of a cruise
ticket in Washington to litigate a claim in Florida. They upheld the
clause, stating that the clause "does not purport to limit petitioner's
liability for negligence."' 6
The Court went on to iterate that if the lessening of liability was
based on "costs and inconvenience to the cargo owner, there would be
no principled basis for distinguishing national from foreign arbitration
clauses."' 7 They used the example that a Seattle cargo owner having to
arbitrate in New York faces more burdens than the same owner being
required to arbitrate in Vancouver." They also stated that it was
against the policy of the statutes to make the courts weigh case by case
the burdens on a particular party in respect to their situation. The
Court used as further support the fact that no other countries have inter-
preted the Hague Rules' as prohibiting foreign forum selection claus-
es.
2
'
Finally, the majority asserted that if the U.S. courts interpreted
COGSA to invalidate foreign arbitration clauses, they would essentially
be "disparag[ing] the authority or competence of international forums
for dispute resolution"' and showing a "distrust of the ability of for-
eign arbitrators to apply the law."23 The Court looked to its earlier
12. Id.; see also 46 U.S.C. app. § 1303 (1975).
13. See Vimar, 115 S. Ct. at 2327.
14. Id.
15. 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
16. Id. at 596-97.
17. Vimar, 115 S. Ct. at 2327.
18. Id. at 2327-28.
19. Id. at 2328.
20. Brussels Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading, 51
Stat. 233 (1924).
21. Vimar, 115 S. Ct. at 2328 (stating that COGSA is based on the Brussels Convention for
the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading to which 66 countries are parties).
See Michael F. Sturley, International Uniform Laws in National Courts: The Influence of Do-
mestic Law in Conflicts of Interpretation, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 729, 776-96 (1987).
22. Vimar, 115 S. Ct. at 2328.
23. Id. at 2329.
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decision in MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Company 4 where they
upheld a foreign forum selection clause and stated that resistance to
foreign forum selection clauses "has little place in an era when...
businesses once essentially local now operate in world markets."2 The
Court also turned to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),26 which was
enacted "to encourage the recognition and enforcement of commercial
arbitration agreements in international contracts and to unify the stan-
dards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards
are enforced."'
C. Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens asserted that the
majority's holding was against precedent. He reviewed the history of
litigation over limitation of liability clauses and noted that even before
the enactment of the Harter Act,2 clauses in bills of lading limiting
liability were "contrary to public policy, and consequently void." '29
The Harter Act was passed by Congress in 1893, and contained a
section which prohibited the limiting of liability due to negligence in
bills of lading.' Justice Stevens pointed out that the Court in Knott v.
24. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
25. Vimar, 115 S. Ct. at 2328 (quoting M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Company, 407
U.S. 1, 12 (1972)). The Court also says in Bremen: "The expansion of American business and
industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a paro-
chial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts." 407 U.S. at
9. See also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985);
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
26. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1976) (known as the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the FAA became
the codifying U.S. legislation on the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, (1970)).
27. Vimar, 115 S. Ct. at 2329 (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. at 520, n.
15 (1974)). See also Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S.Ct. 834 (1995); Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
28. 46 U.S.C. § 190-96 (1975) (the precursor to COGSA and more commonly referred to as
the Harter Act as stated in the text).
29. Vimar, 115 S. Ct. at 2331 (quoting Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix
Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397, 442 (1889)).
30. The section's language is as follows
Stipulations relieving from liability for negligence:
It shall not be lawful for the manager, agent, master, or owner of any
vessel transporting merchandise or property from or between ports of the
United States and foreign ports to insert in any bill of lading or shipping
document any clause, covenant, or agreement whereby it, he, or they shall be
relieved from liability for loss or damage arising from negligence, fault, or
failure in proper loading, stowage, custody, care, or proper delivery of any
and all lawful merchandise or property committed to its or their charge. Any
and all words or clauses of such import inserted in bills of lading or shipping
receipts shall be null and void and of no effect.
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Botany Worsted Mills3' held a foreign choice of law clause, which
designated English law, invalid because it relieved the carrier from
liability.
32
In contrast, COGSA is broader than the Harter Act in prohibiting
clauses that limit liability.33 This is evident in Indussa Corp. v. S.S.
Ranborg34 where the district court held a foreign choice of law clause
unenforceable because "to require an American plaintiff to assert his
claim only in a distant court lessens the liability of the carrier quite
substantially."35 Subsequently, there have been many court decisions
and "scholarly recognition" 36 that have followed Indussa and recog-
nized foreign choice of law provisions as violating COGSA.37
The dissent also argued that the majority's interpretation of
§1303(8) of COGSA went against the purpose of the statute.38 COGSA
§1303(8) was enacted to correct the inequality of bargaining power that
is present in bills of lading.39 Carriers present bills of lading to ship-
pers with no negotiations and the shipper must agree if he wants to
transport his cargo. A carrier can put a clause in the bill of lading,
limiting his liability, and the shipper would not be able to recover.'
Justice Stevens stated that the cost for the shipper to litigate a claim in
a foreign forum would make the shipper less likely to litigate that claim
and consequently, choose to settle and as a result, most likely receive
less compensation than that issued by a court. This would, in effect,
limit the liability of the carrier."
The dissent also criticized the majority's reliance on Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute.42 He contended that the use of Carnival
was "misplaced" and that the case did not apply to the situation before
the court. 3 The judge reasoned that Carnival dealt with a domestic fo-
46 U.S.C. § 190 (1975)(also known as the Harter Act).
31. 179 U.S. 69 (1900).
32. Vimar, 115 S. Ct. at 2332.
33. See id.
34. 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967).
35. Vimar, 115 S. Ct. at 2333 (quoting Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200, 203
(2d Cir. 1967)).
36. Vimar, 115 S. Ct. at 2333.
37. See State Establishment for Agricultural Product Trading v. M/V Wesermunde, 838
F.2d 1576 (8th Cir 1988). See also G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, LAW OF ADMIRALTY 125, n. 23
(1957); G. GLMORE & C. BLACK, LAW OF ADmtALTY 145-47 (2d ed. 1975).
38. Vimar, 115 S. Ct. at 2334.
39. See id.
40. See id. See also United States v. Farr Sugar Corp., 191 F.2d 370, 374 (2d Cir. 1951),
affd 343 U.S. 236 (1952).
41. See Vimar, 115 S. Ct. at 2335.
42. 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
43. Vimar, 115 S. Ct. at 2335.
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rum selection clause, not a foreign clause. Also, COGSA did not apply
in that case because it was based on a passenger ticket and no carriage
of goods was involved."
Finally, the dissent rejected the idea that failure to enforce foreign
arbitration clauses under COGSA would conflict with the FAA.4s The
FAA was "designed to over turn the traditional common law hostility to
arbitration clauses."' It requires that the courts enforce arbitration
clauses just as they would enforce other contract clauses. Justice
Stevens stated that Vimar dealt with a contract that was not freely nego-
tiated (an adhesion contract) and since the FAA seeks to enforce freely
negotiated contracts, the purpose of the FAA would be upheld by the
invalidation of the foreign arbitration clause in this case.'
The dissent continued to say that if the FAA intends to put arbitra-
tion clauses in the same boat as other contract clauses, they are invali-
dated in the same situations as ordinary contract clauses.49 Examples
of these situations include fraud, forgery, mutual mistake, impossibility,
unconscionability and illegality."0 The dissent put the current case in
the last category; illegality. If the clause "lessens liability" under
COGSA, it violates a federal statute and thus makes the clause illegal
and void under general contract theory."1 Consequently, the purposes
of both COGSA and the FAA are upheld by invalidating the foreign
arbitration clause.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S DECISION
The majority opinion in Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V
Sky Reefer goes against long standing precedent and violates the general
purposes of both COGSA and the FAA. Consequently, I propose that
the dissenting opinion is more on point and the majority opinion's
applicability should be limited.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 2337.
46. Id.
47. See id. The relevant section of the FAA reads as follows: "A written provision in any
maritime transaction ... to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such con-
tract... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
48. Vimar, 115 S. CL at 2337.
49. Id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
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A. Decision is Against Precedent
Throughout history carriers have tried to limit their liability for acts
of negligence by inserting special clauses. However, the United States
courts have held that clauses limiting liability are contrary to public
policy. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Liverpool & Great Western Steam
Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. 2, invalidated an antiliability clause that relieved
the carrier from responsibility for damages caused by "barratry of mas-
ter or mariners, and all perils of the seas, rivers or navigation." 3 In
Liverpool, Phenix Insurance Company claimed a right to subrogation
for the loss of their client's goods shipped on one of Liverpool's ships.
The goods were damaged when the ship became stranded due to a bad
storm.54 The Court in Liverpool held that the reason the clause was
invalid was due to unequal bargaining power between the parties.5 At
this time there was no statutory law regulating limitation of liability
clauses in bills of lading. However, as Liverpool shows, the courts up-
held that hose type of clauses were considered against public policy
even before there was a specific statute prohibiting limitation of lia-
bility.
Several years later in 1893, the Harter Act 6 was enacted. Section
190 of this Acte7 prohibited a carrier from inserting clauses limiting
their liability in their bills of lading. The Supreme Court upheld this
prohibition in Knott v. Botany Mills.58 In that case Botany Worsted
Mills, a New Jersey corporation, contracted with James Knott to trans-
port wool on his ship from Buenos Ayres to New York. En route to
New York, the wool sustained damage from the drainage off of wet
sugar that was also on the ship.59 The bill of lading contained a clause
designating a foreign forum.' Applying the Harter Act, the Court held
that "the express provision of the act of Congress overrides and nul-
52. 129 U.S. 397 (1889).
53. Id. at 437.
54. See id. at 435.
55. The clause reads as follows:
The carrier and his customer do not stand upon a footing of equality. The
individual customer has not real freedom of choice. He cannot afford to
higgle or stand out, and seek redress in the courts. He prefers rather to accept
any bill of lading, or to sign any paper, that the carrier presents, and in most
cases he has not alternative but to do this, or to abandon his business.
Id. at 441.
56. 46 U.S.C. § 190-96 (1975).
57. 46 U.S.C. § 190.
58. 179 U.S. 69 (1900).
59. See id. at 70.
60. "This contract shall be governed by the law of the flag of the ship carrying the goods,
except that general average shall be adjusted according to York-Antwerp Rules, 1890." Id. at
70.
1996]
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lifies the stipulations of the bill of lading that the carrier shall be ex-
empt from liability for such negligence, and that the contract shall be
governed by the law of the ship's flag."'" The bill of lading also had a
clause that exempted the carrier from liability for "negligence of mas-
ters or mariners; sweating, rust, natural decay, leakage, or breakage, and
all damage arising from the goods by stowage."62 This was the clause
that caused the Court to apply the Harter Act and eventually to deter-
mine the choice of forum clause invalid.63
The law used for foreign arbitration clauses is the same as that
used for foreign choice-of-law clauses.' Since the Court's decision in
Knott, the lower courts have held that foreign choice of law clauses in
bills of lading are invalid under the Harter Act.6' These courts have
also held that the same kind of clauses are invalid under COGSA. 6
The leading case in this area is Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg.67
Indussa, a New York corporation, contracted with the S.S. Ranborg to
transport a shipment of nails and barbed wire from Belgium to San
Francisco. The shipment was damaged by rust during the transport.'
The Second Circuit held that the foreign choice of law clause designat-
ing the carrier's principal place of business69 as the forum for all
claims was invalid under COGSA.7° The important part of this opinion
stated that even though Norway's law was substantially similar to
COGSA, the shipper could not be sure that the foreign court would
apply United States law.7 This concern, along with the potential liabil-
ity limitations provided by inconvenience on the shipper, convinced the
court to invalidate the foreign choice of forum clause.72
61. Id. at 77.
62. Id. at 70.
63. Id. at 77.
64. See Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322, 2326
(1995). See also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974); State Establishment
for Agricultural Product Trading v. M/V Wesermunde, 838 F.2d 1576, 1580-81 (8th Cir. 1988).
65. See Conklin & Garrett, Ltd. v. M/V Finnrose, 826 F.2d 1441 (5th Cir. 1987); Union
Ins. Soc. of Canton, Ltd. v. S.S. Elikon, 642 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1981); Indussa Corp. v. S.S.
Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200 (2nd Cir. 1967). See also G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, LAW OF ADMI-
RALTY 125, n. 23 (1957).
66. See Vimar, 115 S. Ct. at 2332.
67. 377 F.2d 200 (2nd Cir. 1967).
68. See id. at 200-01.
69. The clause language is as follows: "Any dispute arising under this Bill of Lading shall
be decided in the country where the Carrier has his principal place of business, and the law of
such country shall apply except as provided elsewhere herein." Id. at 201.
70. Id. at 204.
71. Id. at 203-04. See also GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 65.
72. Indussa, 377 F.2d at 203-04. See also GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 65.
[Vol. 4:1
1996] FOREIGN ARBITRATION CLAUSES
In 1981, the Fourth Circuit in Union Insurance Society of Canton,
Limited v. S.S. Elikon" held that a forum selection clause that explicit-
ly invoked COGSA, but required the application of German law,74 was
invalid. This case dealt with a contract to ship air conditioners from
Newport News to the Port of Kuwait on the Persian Gulf and the dam-
age that resulted during their transport." The court looked at the lack
of bargaining power through the use of a preprinted form,7" the inabili-
ty to be certain that United States law would be applied," and the fact
that the bill of lading was printed in English.7' The court also stated
that the general policy of enforcing forum selection clauses must be
pushed aside by the "specific policy enunciated by Congress through
COGSA. ,
79
Recently, in Conklin & Garrett, Ltd. v. M/V Finnrose,s° the Fifth
Circuit court held a foreign forum selection clause8" which required
disputes to be decided in Finland, but that also explicitly stated that
COGSA applied,82 violated COGSA. This claim came about when
73. 642 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1981).
74. The content of the two clauses is as follows:
I. This bill of lading shall have effect subject to the provisions of the Car-
riage of Goods by Sea Act of the United States, approved April 16, 1936,
which shall be deemed to be incorporated herein, and nothing herein con-
tained shall be deemed a surrender by the Carrier of any of its rights or im-
munities or an increase of any of its responsibilities or liabilities under said
Act. The provisions stated in said Act shall (except as otherwise provided
herein) govern before the goods are loaded on and after they are discharged
from the ship and throughout the entire time the goods are in the custody of
the Carrier. The Carrier shall not be liable in any capacity whatsoever for any
delay, nondelivery or misdelivery, or loss or damage to the goods occurring
while the goods are not in the actual custody of the Carrier .... 20. All ac-
tions under this contract shall be brought before the Court of Bremen, Federal
Republic of Germany add the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany shall
apply. No other Court shall have jurisdiction with regard to any such action
unless the carrier appeals to another jurisdiction or voluntarily submits him-
self thereto.
Id. at 722 n.1.
75. See id. at 722.
76. Id. at 724.
77. Id.
78. Union, 642 F.2d at 726.
79. Id. at 725.
80. 826 F.2d 1441 (5th Cir. 1987).
81. The clause language is as follows: "Any dispute arising under this bill of lading shall
be decided in Finland and Finnish law shall apply except as provided elsewhere herein." Id.
82. The clause is as follows: "Notwithstanding any provisions found elsewhere in this B/L,
insofar as the ... carriage covered by this ... contract is performed within the territorial lim-
its of the United States it shall be subject to the provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act... which shall be deemed to be incorporated herein." Id.
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Conklin & Garrett contracted with the M/V Finnrose to transport a
merry-go-round. The merry-go-round was damaged during its transport
from the United Kingdom to Florida.83 This court, as the court in
Elikon, looked at the inequality of bargaining power and the statutory
language of COGSA to hold the clause invalid."'
Subsequently, the Eleventh Circuit held in State Establishment for
Agricultural Product Trading v. MIV Wesermunde85 that a clause re-
quiring arbitration in England for loss of cargo shipped by United
States shipper from Florida to Jordan violated COGSA."6 The cargo of
82,073 cases of fresh eggs was damaged by fire. 7 The court held the
clause invalid because the only party that related to the English forum
was the charterer, and they were not named in the action." This limit-
ed the carrier's liability by providing for a forum that had no relation-
ship to the contract in dispute.
In addition to the above court cases upholding the unenforceability
of foreign choice-of-forum clauses, scholars have noted that this kind of
clause violates COGSA. Gilmore and Black, in their treatise Law of
Admiralty, criticized the enforcement of foreign choice-of-forum claus-
es. They wrote:
The stipulation for suit abroad seems also to offend Cogsa, most obviously
because it destroys the shipper's certainty that Cogsa will be applied. Further,
it is entirely unrealistic to look on an obligation to sue overseas as not
'lessening' the liability of the carrier. It puts a high hurdle in the way of
enforcing that liability.89
Gilmore and Black also endorsed the Second Circuit's decision in
Indussa, and added this comment:
Cogsa allows a freedom of contracting out of its terms, but only in the direc-
tion of increasing the shipowner's liabilities, and never in the direction of
diminishing them. This apparent onesidedness is a commonsense recognition
of the inequality in bargaining power which both Harter and Cogsa were de-
signed to redress, and of the fact that one of the great objectives of both Acts
is to prevent the impairment of the value and negotiability of the ocean bill
of lading. Obviously, the latter result can never ensue from the increase of
the carrier's duties.'"
83. See id. at 1441.
84. Id. at 1444.
85. 838 F.2d 1576 (11th Cir. 1988).
86. Id. at 1582.
87. See id. at 1578.
88. As the court specifically said: "[A] provision requiring arbitration in a foreign country
that has no connection with either the performance of the bill of lading contract or the making
of the bill of lading contract is a provision that would conflict with COGSA's general purpose
of not allowing carriers to lessen their risk of liability." Id. at 1581.
89. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 65.
90. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, LAW OF ADMIRALTY 145-47 (2d ed. 1975).
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Charles L. Black, in a law journal article, disparages the Bremen
decision while singing the praises of Knott.9 In his opinion:
American courts are bound to hold choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses
invalid in COGSA bills, inbound or outbound, for reasons specially appli-
cable to COGSA (because they arise from its text) and not shaken by Bre-
men. The latter case does not require the Supreme Court to overrule, either
literally or in effect, either the considered holdings of two of the best admi-
ralty Courts of Appeals, or its own four-squared precedent in Knott v. Botany
Mills.92
The decision in Vimar goes against precedent. As shown by the
cases above, foreign choice-of-forum clauses (and as a result foreign
arbitration clauses) violate COGSA based on the following factors: (1)
the shipper can not be sure that the foreign court will apply United
States law;93 (2) the inconvenience and transaction costs to the shipper
to arbitrate in a foreign forum limits the liability of the carrier;94 and
(3) the inequality of bargaining power between the shipper and the car-
rier.9" The court in Vimar went against these principles and held the
foreign arbitration clause in the contract enforceable.
B. Decision is Against Purpose of COGSA and FAA
The purpose of COGSA is to remedy the "inequality of bargaining
power inherent in bills of lading and [to limit the] carrier's historic ten-
dency to exploit that inequality whenever possible to immunize them-
selves from liability for their own fault."' The whole value to the car-
rier of foreign arbitration clauses, as with choice-of-forum clauses, is to
limit their liability.97 This is accomplished by the fact that bills of lad-
ing are effectively adhesion contracts that the recipient is required to
accept with all terms, or to do without.9 The shipper has no "real
91. Charles L. Black, The Bremen, COGSA and the Problem of Conflicting Interpretation, 6
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 365 (1973).
92. Id. at 369.
93. See Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200, 203 (2d Cir. 1967). See also Union
Insurance Society of Canton, Ltd v. S.S. Elikon, 642 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1981).
94. See Indussa, 377 F.2d at 203-04. See also State Establishment for Agricultural Product
Trading v. WV Wesermunde, 838 F.2d 1576 (11th Cir. 1988). See also GILMORE & BLACK,
supra note 65; GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 90.
95. See Union Ins. Society of Canton, Ltd. v. S.S. Elikon, 642 F.2d 721, 724; see also
Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397, 441 (1889); Conldin &
Garrett, Ltd. v. MV Finnrose, 826 F.2d 1441, 1444 (5th Cir. 1987); GILMORE & BLACK, supra
note 90.
96. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322, 2334 (1995).
97. See Black, supra note 91, at 366.
98. See Vimar, 115 S. Ct. at 2334; see also Black, supra note 91, at 368; Liverpool &
Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397, 441 (1889).
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freedom of choice" and is not on a level playing field with the carri-
er.9 Thus, the carrier can insert a clause limiting their liability, and
the shipper would have no recourse." These foreign arbitration claus-
es effectively limit the carrier's liability by increasing the costs of liti-
gating a claim. 1' For example, the costs of using a Japanese forum to
arbitrate a claim would greatly overshadow the amount that would be
recovered."' As a result many shippers would choose not to file a
claim instead of risking the loss of a large amount of money." 3 In ef-
fect the clause has not only lessened the carrier's liability, but has "re-
lieved" it of all liability dealing with negligence."°
In addition to violating the purpose of COGSA, the enforcement of
foreign arbitration clauses goes against the purpose of the FAA. 5
The purpose of the FAA is to reject the court's traditional animosity
towards arbitration clauses"° and to uphold "freely-negotiated" ar-
bitration agreements. 7 To this end the FAA has made enforceable
arbitration clauses in maritime transactions subject to their enforceabili-
ty under ordinary contract law. 8
This provision of the FAA makes foreign arbitration clauses subject
to the same law as all other contract clauses."° If this is the case, then
an arbitration clause can be invalidated if it was acquired through
fraud," mutual mistake, impossibility, unconscionability or illegali-
99. See Phenix, 129 U.S. at 441.
100. The court stated: "Obviously the individual shipper has no opportunity to repudiate the
document agreed upon by the trade, even if he has actually examined it and all its twenty-eight
lengthy paragraphs." United States v. Farr Sugar Corp., 191 F.2d 370, 374 (2d Cir. 1951), affid,
343 U.S. 236 (1952).
101. See Vimar, 115 S. Ct. at 2335.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1975).
106. See Mastrobouono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc, 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1215 (1995)
(quoting Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995)).
107. See Vimnar, 115 S. Ct. at 2337.
108. The relevant section is as follows: "A written provision in any maritime transaction...
to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract ... shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revoca-
tion of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
109. See Vimar, 115 S. Ct. at 2337; see also Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc v.
Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995); Mastrobouono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct.
1212 (1995); Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
University, 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
110. See Vimar, 115 S. Ct. at 2337; see Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Company, 417 U.S. 506,
519 n.14 (1974).
[Vol. 4:1
FOREIGN ARBITRATION CLAUSES
ty."' Illegality can mean that the clause violates a federal statute.112
If a foreign arbitration clause "lessens" the liability of the carrier, it
violates COGSA."' Thus, since COGSA is a federal statute, the
clause is illegal and unenforceable under general contract theory and
under the FAA." 4
Additionally, the FAA requires foreign arbitration clauses to be
enforceable under general contract theory, and to be "freely negotiated";
it would stand to reason that a foreign arbitration clause in a bill of
lading would be unenforceable. 15 The courts have continuously recog-
nized that bills of lading are usually adhesion contracts and that the
shipper usually has no chance to negotiate terms to his advantage." 6
Thus, since bills of lading are not "freely negotiated", it would not
violate the FAA to strike down foreign arbitration clauses that are con-
tained in the bills."7
IV. SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS
Despite the above criticisms, the Supreme Court's decision in
Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MIV Sky Reefer has been applied
by lower courts to validate arbitration clauses under COGSA.1 ' Re-
cently, the United States District Court in Oregon used Vimar to bind a
consignee to a foreign arbitration clause in a bill of lading.
In Kanematsu Corp v. M/V Gretchen W,"9 Kanematsu contracted
to purchase 37,000 tons of corn from Louis Dreyfus Corporation
(Dreyfus), who arranged to ship the corn from Louisiana to Japan.
Dreyfus chartered the M/V Gretchen W from Hyundai, and Dreyfus and
Hyundai entered into a bill of lading.2 The bill of lading provided
for arbitration of any disputes in London, England.' When the ship-
111. See Vimar, 115 S. Ct. at 2337.
112. See id.
113. See 46 U.S.C. § 1303 (1994) (known as COGSA).
114. See Vimar, 115 S. Ct. at 2337.
115. See id.
116. See id.; see also United States v. Far Sugar Corp., 191 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1951).
117. See Vimar, 115 S. Ct. at 2337.
118. For other non-COGSA decisions applying Vimar, see Effron v. Sun Line Cruises, Inc.,
67 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995); Nippon Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. M.V. Egasco Star, 899 F.
Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Aviall, Inc. v. Ryder System, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir.
1995); Morewitz v. West of England Ship Owners Mut. Protection and Indemnity Ass'n (Lux-
embourg), 62 F.3d 1356 (11 th Cir. 1995).
119. 897F. Supp. 1314 (D. Or. 1995).
120. See id. at 1315.
121. The relevant clause is as follows: "All terms, conditions and provisions of the Strike,
Knighterage Clause No. 6 and Arbitration Clause of the "Centrocon" charter party would ap-
ply." The Centrocon charter provides that "all disputes from time to time arising out of this
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ment of corn arrived in Japan, it was discovered to be damaged by
exposure to water and heat.122 Kanematsu then sued MIV Gretchen W
under the bill of lading. The District Court stayed Kanematsu's action
pending the decision in Vimar, since the issues in that case were the
same. Citing the decision in Vimar, the District Court upheld the arbi-
tration clause in the bill of lading despite Kanematsu's argument that
they were only a consignee, unlike the petitioner in Vimar.'"
The court rejected the "consignee" argument for three reasons.
First, the lower court judge in that case had previously found that
Dreyfus had acted as an agent for Kanematsu, thus binding them to the
bill of lading. 24 Second, the court said that under Vimar, the fact that
Kanematsu did not sign the bill of lading or directly consent to its
conditions does not free it from the terms of the bill of lading."z
Third, the fact that Kanematsu brought a suit for damaged goods under
the terms of the bill of lading means that they consented to all of the
conditions of the bill of lading.' Thus, even though Kanematsu did
not expressly agree to the bill of lading, it is bound by its terms. The
court also rejected Kanematsu's argument that this result would be
inequitable based on the fact that: (1) Kanematsu was familiar with the
grain trade; 127 (2) Kanematsu was a Japanese importer and would not
be inconvenienced by resolving the dispute in London instead of the
U.S.; 28 (3) the London arbitration would be conducted by people fa-
miliar with the grain trade;'29 and (4) the District Court retained en-
forcement jurisdiction to assure a decision consistent with COGSA."3 '
Another United States District Court in Virginia has also used the
Court's decision in Vimar to validate a forum selection clause in a bill
of lading. As mentioned above, the same law is used for foreign arbi-
tration clauses as is used for foreign choice of law clauses.' 3 ' In
Pasztory v. Croatia Line,32 Pasztory contracted to have $80,000
contract shall.., be referred to the final Arbitrament of two Arbitrators carrying on business
in London."
Id.
122. See id.
123. See Kanematsu Corp. v. M/V Gretchen W, 897 F. Supp. 1314, 1315-16 (D.Or. 1995).
124. See id. at 1316.
125. Id. at 1317.
126. See id.; see also All Pacific Trading Inc. v. WV Hanjin Yosu, 7 F.3d 1427, 1432 (9th
Cir. 1993), cert denied., U.S. - 114 S. Ct. 1301, 127 L.Ed. 2d 653 (1994).
127. See Kanematsu, 897 F. Supp. at 1317.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322, 2326
(1995).
132. 918 F. Supp 961 (D.Va. 1996).
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worth of his furniture and personal affects shipped from Italy to Nor-
folk, Virginia. The ship was owned by Malta Cross and operated by
Croatia Line. Pasztory also contracted with Security Storage to take the
furniture from Norfolk to his residence in Locust Dale, Virginia.'33
The bill of lading contained a forum selection clause that required all
disputes to be pursued in the District Commercial Court in Rijeka,
Croatia.'34 Somewhere en route from Italy to Locust Dale, the furni-
ture sustained $50,000 worth of damage. Pasztory then brought suit in
Virginia under the bill of lading. After going through the history of
cases supporting and invalidating forum selection clauses, the court
enforced the forum selection clause based on section 3(8) of
COGSA 35 and the fact that Croatia recognizes and enforces the
Hague Rules upon which COGSA is modeled. Thus, meaning that
Croatia would not follow a standard less than that of COGSA.'
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A.
v. M/V Sky Reefer flies in the face of precedent and also violates the
purposes of both COGSA and the FAA. Even though Justice Stevens
stated in his dissent that the court's decision in this case "leaves in
doubt the validity of choice-of-law clauses", 3' lower courts have al-
ready started applying Vimar as overruling the Indussa line of cases and
as primary authority for the proposition that arbitration clauses are
enforceable under the Carriage Of Goods by Sea Act.
Cherie L. LaCour
133. See id. at 963.
134. The forum selection clause is as follows:
23. LAW AND JURISDICTION
Insofar as anything has not been dealt with by terms and conditions of this
Bill of Lading, Croatian law shall apply. Croatian Law shall also be applied
in interpreting the terms and conditions hereof. All actions arising under this
Bill of Lading shall be brought before the District Commercial Court in
Rijeka to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the courts of any other place,
unless the Carrier appeals to another jurisdiction or voluntarily submits him-
self thereto.
Id. at 963 n.2.
135. Id. at 966. See Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322,
2327 (1995). ("Nothing in [this section] ... suggests that the statute prevents the parties from
agreeing to enforce these obligations in a particular forum.")
136. See Pasztory, 918 F. Supp. at 966.
137. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322, 2334 (1995).
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